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EVIDENCE*
HARRY P. THaoMSON, JR.**
WILLIAm B. JENSEN***
I. CONTINUED APPLICATION OF THE TEST OF PROBATIVE FORCE
It appears that the supreme court has continued in recent decisions
to apply the test of probative force to determine the admissibility of evi-
dence. As previously stated,' this test requires that evidence, to be admissi-
ble, must be of sufficient force so that if believed it logically tends to prove
or disprove a fact or issue necessary to a decision of the particular case. The
term "probative force" occasionally appears, but in most cases this term
is not used by the court to explain its decision. Rather, the court continues
to refer to historical formalized rules and exceptions. Yet, an understanding
of apparently conflicting results reached in different decisions can only be
obtained by applying the probative force test.
II. THE USE OF THE PROBATIVE FORCE TEST TO DETERMINE WHAT
CONSTITUTES SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
A conflict in the testimony of different witnesses offered by the same
party does not necessarily destroy the probative force of all of such testi-
mony. In Young v. Kansas City Southern Ry.2 plaintiff appealed on the
ground that the judgment and verdict of $5,000.00 was inadequate. De-
fendant called two doctors as expert witnesses, each of whom testified
to the nature and extent of plaintiff's injuries. Plaintiff argued that the
testimony of one of defendant's expert witnesses required a much higher
verdict and conceded that the testimony of the other doctor, standing
alone, constituted substantial evidence supporting the $5,000.00 verdict. In
view of the conflicting testimony, plaintiff contended that the substantiality
and probative force of the testimony of both doctors was destroyed. In
*This article contains a discussion of elected Missouri court decisions re-
ported in volumes 371 through 381 of South Western Reporter, Second Series.S**Partner, Shughart, Thomson & Kilroy, Kansas City, Missouri; A.B. 1937,
LL.B. 1939, University of Missouri.
***Associate, Shughart, Thomson & Kilroy, Kansas City, Missouri; LL.B. 1960,
Drake University.
1. Thomson, Evidence, 28 Mo. L. REv. 539 (1963).
2. 374 S.W.2d 150 (Mo. 1964).
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this case plaintiff directly referred to the term "probative force." The court
in applying formalized rules of evidence stated that a party is not bound
by the testimony of one of his witnesses insofar as such testimony is con-
tradicted by that party's other evidence. Such testimony may be accepted
or rejected by the jury in whole or in part. In effect, the court held that
the substantiality and probative force of one of defendant's witnesses was
not destroyed by the conflicting testimony of the other witness. In this
case the jury merely performed its function of deciding that the testimony
of one of defendant's witnesses had greater probative force than that of the
other witness.
In the Young case, the court was not applying the test of probative
force to determine the admissibility of evidence. That question was not
discussed since the admissibility of the evidence was not in issue. Plaintiff
had also presented evidence of an expert medical witness which would have
supported a much higher verdict. It appears that what the plaintiff was
really contending was that the testimony of both of defendant's witnesses
was of sufficient force to be admissible but when a conflict occurred in the
testimony of defendant's two witnesses, the substantiality and probative
force of the testimony of both witnesses was destroyed and should have
been removed from jury consideration in arriving at a verdict. There-
fore, the jury would have been required to consider only the testimony of
plaintiff's expert medical witness in determining the extent of the injuries
to plaintiff and arriving at a verdict. The court did not agree and decided
that the testimony of both of defendant's witnesses was substantial and of
sufficient probative force to be admissible and the jury could select what
testimony it preferred to believe.
The court applied the same formal rule in the case of Hinds v. Kircker
where the evidence presented by plaintiff was contradictory to that pre-
sented by defendant. In this case plaintiff's evidence established a collision
between plaintiff's automobile and an automobile driven by defendant;
but defendant produced evidence that no collision occurred. Here a verdict
for either party would have been supported by substantial evidence and
the jury in holding for the defendant merely determined that the probative
force of defendant's evidence was greater than that of plaintiff's. The same
formalized rule of evidence was applied by the court to conflicting evi-
dence between parties as that applied in the Young cases to conflicting evi-
dence of a party's own witnesses.
3. 379 S.W.2d 607 (Mo. 1964).
4. Young v. Kansas City Southern Ry., supra note 2.
[Vol. 30
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The opinion in Coff'man v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry.5 is an exceed-
ingly clear explanation that reasonable inferences from specific evidence
have substantial probative force. There, a jury verdict in the amount
of $270,000.00 for a quadraplegic plaintiff was reduced to a judgment of
$220,000.00. It is a constantly reoccurring problem to measure in a mone-
tary amount the future value of plaintiff's injury, medical expenses, loss of
earnings, and life expectancy. In considering such cases, the Coffinan
opinion is required reading. The court made a detailed review of the evi-
dence and illustrated the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from
various portions of the evidence. Here the principal was restated that an
essential element of the plaintiff's case or of a defense may be supplied by
inference from a fact or testimony as to a specific subject. So long as the
jury's verdict is based upon a reasonable presumption founded upon the
evidence, then the evidence taken as a whole has sufficient probative
value to support the jury verdict. Of course, reasonable inferences from
other definitive evidence or circumstantial evidence may be used and has
sufficient probative force to establish facts which have already occurred
and such presumptions and circumstantial evidence are not limited to
proving facts in the future.
III. THE PROEATIVE FORCE OF EVIDENCE MAY BE AGAINST
THE PARTY INTRODUCING IT
Wiliams v. CavenderO illustrates the point that evidence may be ad-
missible under the probative force test but that the force of the evidence
itself may be against the party offering it. There plaintiff brought an ac-
tion for the death of her husband, as a result of the head-on collision of
two automobiles. There were no witnesses to the collision. The only evi-
dence as to how the collision occurred was supplied by the investigating high-
way patrol officer who was called as a witness by plaintiff. The court de-
cided that the physical facts found by the highway patrol officer did not
establish that the deceased driver of the defendant's automobile was or
was not negligent. Then the court went on to hold that the physical facts
did establish that plaintiff's deceased husband was guilty of negligence
either directly causing or directly contributing to the cause of the collision
as a matter of law. Thus, plaintiff was barred from recovery and the judg-
ment in plaintiff's favor was reversed because of the probative force of
5. 378 S.W.2d 583 (Mo. 1964).
6. 378 S.W.2d 537 (Mo. 1964).
1965]
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the evidence introduced by plaintiff. This illustrates that evidence pre-
sented by one party which is admissible under the "probative force rule"
may prove an ultimate issue as a matter of law in favor of another party
to the litigation.
IV. THE PROBATIVE FORCE OF JUDIcIAL NOTICE
Judicial notice is an example of the working of the probative force
test. The function of the doctrine of judicial notice is to excuse a party
having the burden of establishing a fact from the necessity of formal proof
of the fact by objective evidence.7 The facts or state of facts of which
the court will take judicial notice are constantly changing. What is com-
mon knowledge today may not have been known even ten years ago. The
constant change in what is included in the area "common knowledge"
or "encyclopedic knowledge" or "established scientific fact" forces a
recognition that certain areas of judicial notice have changed or are chang-
ing.
There is no way of being certain that the court will take judicial
notice of a matter unless the supreme court has by prior decisions under
the same or similar circumstances taken judicial notice of the same sub-
ject matter. Therefore, the careful lawyer will be certain that the court
will take judicial notice of an essential fact or element of his client's case
before relying upon the probative force of judicial notice to establish that
fact. Judicial notice once taken has absolute probative force and in reality
is not a matter of evidence. Rather, it is the elimination of the necessity of
evidence.
In Httig v. City of Ricmond Heigkts8 the court took judicial notice
of the changes which have taken place since 1941 in the Richmond Heights
area of St. Louis County. In Martin v. SloanP the court took judicial
notice that there was no town or community between two geographic
points.
An excellent illustration of the absolute probative force arising from
the court's judicial notice of a particular state of facts is found in Mt.
Olivet Baptist CIkurcht v. George.10 There plaintiffs contended that the de-
fendant, George, was required to drive as close as practical to the right
curb of a street while turning onto another street in accordance with the
7. McCoRmicK, EvIDENCE 687 (1954).
8. 372 S.W.2d 833 (Mo. 1963).
9. 377 S.W.2d 252 (Mo. 1964).
10. 378 S.W.2d 549 (Mo. 1964).
[Vol. 30
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appropriate Kansas statute. Plaintiffs further contended that the physical
facts and circumstances in evidence constituted a substantial showing
that defendant had violated this statutory -duty so that defendant was
negligent as a matter of law. The court held that plaintiff did not make a
submissible case for the jury, pointing out that it was common knowledge
and a physical fact that a vehicle 45 feet long could not hug or be im-
mediately adjacent to the curb along the vehicle's full length while the
vehicle was making a right-hand turn. The court stated that no 45-foot
vehicle could do this and remain in the roadway.
In Ward v. City Natl Bank & Trust Co.11 the court took judicial
notice of continued and gradual reduction of the value of the dollar and the
forces of inflation. The court stated that while the verdict was a liberal
award, it would not order remittitur because of the inflationary forces of
which it took judicial notice.
V. PROBATIVE FORCE OF PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE
In Jones v. Smnitk' 2 photographs were admitted in evidence showing
the location of an accident. The photographs were taken on a clear, sunny
day, but it was obvious that the collision had actually occurred during a
heavy rain. The court held that it had long been the rule that photographs
of a location or of objects are admissible in evidence even though taken
long after the event and when changes have occurred. Here the jury was
made fully aware of the difference in conditions between the time of the
collision and the time of the taking of the photographs. Therefore, no abuse
of discretion was made by the trial court in admitting the photographs as
they were of sufficient probative force to show sight, distances and physical
facts at the scene of the collision.
The court reached a similar result in the case of Boydston v. Burton. 3
where photographs showing the view that each motorist involved in an
accident had of the other motorist were admitted even though taken
some two years after the accident. If the photographs are of sufficient
probative force that they tend to prove or disprove a fact or issue neces-
sary to a decision of the case, they are admissible. This is true regardless
of whether or not the photographs were taken after the conditions had
11. 379 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. 1964).
12. 372 S.W.2d 71 (Mo. 1963).
13. 379 S.W.2d 536 (Mo. 1964).
1965]
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changed. However, the court will require other evidence to establish the
changed conditions so that the danger of misleading the jury is minimized.
In the Boydsto case the court also admitted color transparencies
showing a peg which had been driven into plaintiff's leg for the purpose of
attaching traction as well as the traction device. These transparencies
were objected to on the grounds that they were inflammatory and
prejudicial and that there was no showing that they accurately portrayed
the matters they showed. The court distinguished two prior cases, Faughlt
v. Washal 4  and Kickam v. Carter15 and held that the subject matter por-
trayed was not of such inflammatory or prejudicial nature as would justify
the view that the court abused its discretion in admitting them. In distin-
guishing the Faugkt case the court in Boydston said:
Inherent in the quality of the photographs there under scrutiny
was that of a distinct want of natural color renditioning both as
to parts affected and background as well, and this was so pro-
nounced or distorted as to make their probable inflammatory and
prejudicial effect outweigh their probative value. 8
In effect it appears that what the court is really saying with respect
to color photographs, is that where there is a distinct want of natural
color renditioning, the photographs so inaccurately portray the subject
matter that they have little or no probative force.
VL ExPERT AND OPINION EVIDENCE
In Keith v. Jos. G. Schimersald Co.17 plaintiff brought an action for
injuries sustained in a fall on the steps of defendant's display home. There
was a plastic cover on the steps of the stairway upon which plaintiff fell. A
similar plastic cover was offered in evidence and there was testimony to
establish that the plastic cover offered was identical or similar to the one
upon which the plaintiff fell. An engineer made certain tests with the par-
ticular strip of plastic offered in evidence and plaintiff contended that the
court erred in permitting the engineer to testify to the result of this ex-
periment because it created a false impression in that the jury was led
to believe that the plastic upon which plaintiff had fallen was not slick or
slippery. A simple test was performed by the engineer, consisting of pulling
14. 329 S.W.2d 588 (Mo. 1959).
15. 314 S.W.2d 902 (Mo. 1958).
16. Boydston v. Burton, supra note 13, at 542.
17. 371 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. 1963).
[Vol. 30
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a weighted block with a scale attached across eight types of material em-
ployed as floor covering. The court said:
The simple test performed by the engineer, pulling a weighted
block with a scale attached across eight types of material em-
ployed as floor covering, was not particularly impressive from a
scientific standpoint (Annotation 76 A.L.R.2d 354, 374), but from
mere observation the jury was as capable of drawing the proper
inference as was the expert (James v. Kansas City Gas Co., 325
Mo. 1054, 1070, 30 S.W.2d 118, 124), and in all the circumstances
it may not be said that the trial court manifestly abused its discre-
tion in permitting the witness to testify as to the results of his
experiments."8
What the court appears to be saying is that testimony of the expert
witness as to the result of the experiment had little probative value, but
since the jury could draw its own conclusions from mere observation, the
trial court had not manifestly abused its discretion in permitting the engi-
neer to testify and no reversible error occurred.
In Jones v. Smitkl9 plaintiff objected to the admission of testimony
of defendant's expert witness, as to what would happen when vehicles col-
lided head-on at various speeds and angles, what he would expect to find
in the road after a collision, and which wheel of a Chevrolet would carry
the weight upon an assumed impact, for the reason that such testimony
was an improper subject for expert testimony. The court cited the rule that
the admission of expert testimony in a given situation rests in the first in-
stance on the sound discretion of the trial court and its decision in those
respects will not be set aside in the absence of a showing of an abuse of
discretion. The court held that in the instant case the trial court had care-
fully limited the witness's testimony, particularly as to matters of opinion
relating to question of common knowledge and also on the strongly con-
tested issue of the angle at which the vehicles collided. Therefore, there
was no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.
In Harris v. Goggins-0 an action by the administrator of decedent's
estate was instituted for personal injuries sustained by the decedent. A doc-
tor who had never examined the decedent was permitted to testify as an
expert for plaintiff. He had merely examined the records of Bonne Terre
Hospital and of Barnes Hospital, which related to the decedent. These
18. Id. at 336.
19. Supra note 12.
20. 374 S.W.21 6 (Mo. En Banc 1963).
19651
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records were admitted in their entirety. The expert was asked to state vari-
ous opinions based upon those records and an objection was made that this
was improper because based on hearsay. Other hypothetical questions
were based on these records and objections were made that the questions
were based upon facts not in evidence. The court ruled that this was prop-
er testimony by an expert since the hospital records were in evidence and
the expert's opinion based on these records was admissible. The doctor's
testimony had sufficient probative force where his opinions were based on
hospital records already in evidence.
An example of where certain doctor's notes taken in consultation with
plaintiff were inadmissible is the case of Johnson v. Sandweg.2' The records
revealed that plaintiff had been married three times and that two of the
marriages terminated in divorce. The court held that to admit that portion
of the notes revealing the previous marriages and divorces of plaintiff was
reversible error. The evidence of plaintiff's prior marriages did not tend to
prove or disprove a fact or issue necessary to a decision of the case. Thus, in
applying the test of probative force this evidence was inadmissible.
Another kind of expert evidence was acknowledged by the court as
having probative force in Ward v. City Nat'l Bank & Tr-ust Co.22 where
the American Standard Safety Code for elevators was used as evidence in
the examination of witnesses. Witnesses testified that many concerns fol-
low that code and there was evidence that the new code was published
while the elevator was under construction and was adopted by the City of
Kansas City before the elevator was turned over to the owner. The court
said that the standards are promulgated by experts in that line of business
and ruled that in using the code there was no error committed and this
was evidence which the jury could consider on the question of negligence.
The court thereby decided that the code had sufficient probative force to
permit its use in the questioning of witnesses. The fact that witnesses in
the instant case had testified that many concerns follow the code and that
Kansas City had adopted it established its probative value.
An interesting case discussing the use of expert testimony is Pzilips v.
Shaw23 where testimony by expert witnesses, an engineer and a physician,
was refused. In this case plaintiff was trying to prove that something had
been thrown by defendant's lawn mower causing an injury to plaintiff's leg.
Offers of proof were made that the engineer would have testified that
21. 378 S.W.2d 454 (Mo. 1964).
22. Supra note 11.
23. 381 S.W.2d 768 (Mo. 1964).
(Vol. 30
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in his opinion something thrown by defendant's lawn mower could have
caused plaintiff's injury and that if a part of the lawn mower had broken
off, it would have been propelled a distance of thirty feet. He would have
further testified that at the time of his inspection of the lawn mower he
found numerous nicks on the lawn mower blade. The inspection of the
mower was made more than two years after the injury occurred. The court
held that the first two questions that the engineer would have testified to
were questions for the jury and that the expert's testimony would not
have aided the jury in the determination of the ultimate issue of negligence.
The court further held that the last item was too remote from the time of
the accident. It appears that what the court was really saying is that the
matters that the expert was attempting to testify to did not tend to
prove or disprove a fact or issue necessary to a decision and, therefore,
were of no help to the jury in reaching its decision. The same application
was made to the testimony sought to be elicited from plaintiff's physician
as to whether the operation of the lawn mower caused the injury to plain-
tiff's leg.
VII. RELEVANCY OF EVIDENCE WITH RESPECT TO
THE TEST OF PROBATIVE FORCE
Switzer v. Switzer24 was a will contest case in which Hadley Switzer
and his wife were accused of exerting undue influence upon the testator,
George L. Switzer. Various parties involved in the contest, including Had-
ley Switzer, farmed portions of testator's farms on a fifty-fifty basis with
testator. During the cross-examination of Hadley Switzer, the contestants
developed the fact that he had purchased fertilizer worth about 2,000
dollars in 1960, and, over objections that the evidence was irrelevant, it
was shown that subsequent to testator's death, he had charged against
testator's estate 5,900 dollars for fertilizer and seed, including purchases in
1961 and 1962. This evidence was admitted on the theory that contestants
were attacking the witness's credibility. Hadley Switzer testified that he
had the approval of testator's administrator for these purchases. The
court held:
Evidence in any suit should be relevant; and evidence that throws
no light on the controversy should be excluded as it tends to
confuse the issues and operate to prejudice a party before the jury.
24. 373 S.W.2d 930 (Mo. 1964).
1965]
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To invalidate a will, undue influence must be directly connected
with the execution of the will, must operate at that time, and must
destroy the free agency of testator in the execution of the will.
Baker v. Spears, supra, 210 S.W.2d 13, 18(5). Hadley Switzer's
purchase of seed or fertilizer after testator's death in August, 1960,
and charging the same against testator's estate is a collateral mat-
ter involving the rights of testator's estate against him or the
vendors against him or said estate. It does not tend to establish
Hadley's exercise of undue influence over testator at the time of
the execution of the will of July 31, 1959.25
In the instant case the court held that the evidence was inadmissible
because it did not tend to prove or disprove a fact or issue necessary to a
determination of the case. Note that the court actually mentioned in this
case that evidence which throws no light on the controversy should be ex-
cluded as it tends to confuse the issues. Therefore, such evidence has no
probative force.
In Charles F. Curry anrd Co. v. Hedrick26 an action for damages was
instituted by plaintiff against defendant arising out of the sale of an air-
plane to plaintiff. The airplane was officially "grounded" as unairworthy
by the Federal Aviation Agency about seven months after purchase. It was
later returned to defendant by plaintiff for correction of the discrepancies
which took a considerable length of time, and defendant refused to return
the plane to plaintiff without first receiving among other things a release
for any liability with respect to loss of use of the plane for the time it was
being repaired. Plaintiff was informed by defendant that defendant would
let the airplane sit unless the plaintiff, among other things, released de-
fendant from liability in writing. Count One of plaintiff's petition, for the
loss of use of the airplane, was based upon alleged breaches of certain
expressed warranties and Count Three was in trover for alleged conversion.
Plaintiff sought exemplary damages as well as actual damages under its
conversion count. Plaintiff claimed error in the exclusion of evidence that
the defendant let the airplane sit outside for fifteen months without running
its engines with resulting damages to the aircraft. Defendant argued that
if it converted the airplane on December 28, its treatment of it thereafter
was its business and not plaintiff's. The court held that it was error not to
admit this evidence since evidence of other acts of the defendant than
those alleged for which damages were sought, both preceding as well as
25. Id. at 939.
26. 378 S.W.2d 522 (Mo. 1964).
[Vol. 30
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following the particular acts, was admissible under an issue of exemplary
damages if so connected with the particular acts as tending to show de-
fendant's disposition, intention or motive in the commission of the par-
ticular acts for which damages were claimed. Here was an example of evi-
dence having probative force where it did not tend to prove or disprove
a fact bearing on a principal issue, but only had value in relation to the
issue of exemplary damages.
Another example of evidence which was properly admitted when
normally it would have been excluded is found in the case of State v. Sal-
mark Home Builders, IM.2Y This was a condemnation action in which
defendant's witness made statements on cross-examination which were
contradictory to statements made in a prior trial. In the transcript of
the prior trial there was evidence of amounts paid by a condemnor or re-
ceived by condemnee for other property included in the same condemnation
proceedings as in the instant case. Defendant's contention was that the
trial court erred in permitting the testimony from the prior trial to be read
when it contained statements of amounts paid even though the property
was included in the same condemnation proceedings. The court announced
that there was no doubt but that the law does not permit a showing of how
much was paid or received for land involved in the same condemnation
project. However, the court went on to say that this rule had no applica-
tion when the information as to the price paid or received was disclosed
upon proper cross-examination of a witness. The court said:
Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the disclosure
in question was a proper fact for the jury to consider, along with
Mr. Ong's explanations, in weighing the witness's testimony as to
value and damages, and thus that the trial court did not err in
permitting the cross-examination in question.28
While the evidence admitted would normally have been inadmissible, in
view of the conflicting testimony of the witness, the evidence became ad-
missible to help the jury in determining the probative value of the testi-
mony. Therefore, the testimony given by the same witness in the prior
trial as to amounts paid for other property included in the same condemna-
tion proceedings was not admitted for the purpose of establishing the value
of the property in the instant proceeding, but it was of sufficient probative
force to be admissable since it tended to prove or disprove and help the
jury in determining the value of the testimony elicited in the instant case.
27. 375 S.W.2d 92 (Mo. 1964).
28. Id. at 97.
19651
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VIII. PROBATIVE FORCE AND PRESUMPTIONS
In Tilton v. Woods2 a suit in equity was brought for a judicial
declaration that a contract whereby the plaintiff agreed to devise a farm to
defendants if they would farm it during their lifetime had been terminated
and canceled by a subsequent release and quit-claim deed. Defendants filed
a counterclaim. The court held that the contract was canceled, abrogated
and rescinded by the release and quit-claim deed. Plaintiff did not testify
and defendants sought the benefit of a presumption that plaintiff's testi-
mony would have been unfavorable to plaintiff because of her failure to
testify. Defendants attacked the validity of the release on the grounds
that it was paid by misrepresentation, fraud and duress and that it was
not supported by a valuable consideration. The court held that the burden
of proof on the issue of mistake was upon the defendants and that they
did not sustain that burden. Therefore, no unfavorable presumption would
arise because of plaintiff's failure to testify since defendants had not made
a prima facie case. The court cited the rule that no duty rests upon the
party charged to speak until the other party has introduced evidence which,
unexplained, makes a case against him. This was an example of a party not
sufficiently sustaining the burden of proof to give rise to a presumption
and therefore not benefiting from the probative force that such presump-
tion would carry.
In Terminal Warehouses v. Reiners,30 plaintiff, Terminal Warehouses,
brought an action against Reiners for the damage to its truck arising out
of an automobile collision. Reiners counterclaimed against Terminal Ware-
houses and the driver of its truck. The only evidence as to the agency re-
lationship between the driver of the truck and Terminal Warehouses, was
that Terminal Warehouses owned the truck involved in the accident and
that the truck was being driven by a Walter W. Bollman. There was no evi-
dence to establish that Bollman was the regular employee of Terminal
Warehouses. The court acknowledged that the general rule is that upon
proof that a certain employer owned a certain vehicle which was being
driven at the time in question by one of its regular employees, a presump-
tion arises that such employee was driving the vehicle in the service of his
employer. The court further stated that upon substantial proof to the con-
trary, the presumption disappears but the facts giving rise to the presump-
tion remain. However, in the instant case where the only proof was that
29. 371 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1963).
30. 371 S.W.2d 311 (Mo. 1963).
[Vol. 30
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the truck involved in the accident was owned by Terminal Warehouses
and that the driver of the truck was Bollman, but there was no proof that
Bollman was a regular employee of Terminal Warehouses, the court decided
that a presumption arose that Bollman was Terminal's agent but upon
substantial evidence to the contrary the presumption was destroyed and
the facts remaining did not support a reasonable inference of agency be-
tween Bollman and Terminal. Therefore, no submissibie case was made on
the issue of agency. This case is required reading for any lawyer trying to
establish an agency relationship.
St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Krueger31 is a case which should be of
interest to every lawyer who engages in probate work. Here, the court
held that when a testator devises a fractional part of his estate to a named
beneficiary, that share should represent the fractional share of the estate
available for distribution after payment of all debts, claims, administra-
tion expenses, taxes, including federal estate taxes, and other lawful charges.
This was a case of first instance on this precise point in Missouri. The
court said:
It must be presumed that the testatrix, as an adult person mentally
capable of managing her affairs and making her will, knew that the
various charges imposed by law against the property of her estate
would have to be paid by her executors before the legatees desig-
nated in her will could be paid the various amounts from her
distributable estate.3
2
In the instant case the presumption appears to be a rule of substantive law
which arises without the requirement of any evidence on the matter. How-
ever, this presumption can also be rebutted.
IX. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE AND THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE
In Bakelite Co. v. Miller3 plaintiff sought, among other things, to re-
cover a sum of money as the alleged balance due on an open account for
merchandise sold and delivered by plaintiff to the J. H. Miller Manufactur-
ing Company, the payment of which had been guaranteed in writing by
the individual defendants. There was a jury verdict for the defendants on
that issue. Recognizing the general rule that the jury could believe or dis-
believe the plaintiff's uncontradicted or uncontroverted evidence and if it
did not believe the evidence, it could find for the defendants, plaintiff
31. 377 S.W.2d 303 (Mo. En Banc 1964).
32. Id. at 304.
33. 372 S.W.2d 867 (Mo. 1963).
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sought to bring itself within an exception to this general rule contending
that its evidence was uncontradicted and since its proof was largely docu-
mentary the general rule as to "conclusive documentary evidence" should
be applied. The court said that the general rule as to "conclusive docu-
mentary evidence" applies to an instrument or record having legal efficacy
to which the one sought to be bound is in some way a party, or the truth
of which he vouches for, either expressly or in legal effect, or is estopped
to deny. It was held that the only "documents" which plaintiff referred
to were its own books and records which were not offered in evidence,
and even if they had been offered, those books and certain letters written
by plaintiff to defendants were not "documentary" within the meaning
of the exception to the general rule that the jury may believe or disbelieve
plaintiff's evidence. The records which plaintiff attempted to rely on did
not have sufficient probative force to warrant the application of the con-
clusive documentary evidence rule and the jury was free to determine the
value of such evidence.
X. ADMISSIONS AGAINST INTEREST
Hill v. Seaboard Fire & Marine Izs. Co.34 involved a suit on an unin-
sured motorist clause of an automobile insurance policy issued by defend-
ant to plaintiff. There was evidence of statements made by a claims ad-
juster for defendant that the other vehicle with which plaintiff's vehicle
came in contact was uninsured. Defendant's objection was that the state-
ment was made by one not authorized by the defendant corporation and
that the testimony was hearsay. The court held that the adjuster's declara-
tions, in the nature of admissions against the interest of the defendant
and made within the scope of his employment and in direct connectipn with
his investigation of plaintiff's claim and as a part of the transaction itself
was evidence in the case and could be considered as such. It appears that
the court held that these admissions as long as they were made within the
scope of the adjuster's employment were of sufficient probative force to be
considered.
XI. PROBATIVE FORCE OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED WRONGFULLY
In Diener v. Mid-American Coaches, I nc.3 5 a bus belonging to defend-
ant collided with an automobile. Plaintiff was a passenger on defendant's
bus. A pathologist testified as to the alcoholic content of the blood of
34. 374 S.W.2d 606 (K.C. Mo. App. 1963).
35. 378 S.W.2d 509 (Mo. 1964).
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deceased driver of the automobile with which the bus collided. Plaintiff
contended that this evidence was incompetent because obtained by the un-
lawful and criminal desecration of a dead body amounting to an uncon-
stitutional search and seizure, and the use of the data obtained was against
public policy. The court held that evidence which is otherwise admissible
will not be excluded because it has been obtained fraudulently, wrongfully
or illegally. In so holding, the Court said that this constitutional right is
personal in nature and plaintiff had no standing to complain or urge the
constitutional question since it was not plaintiff's blood that was drawn
and there was no showing of a relationship between plaintiff and the
driver of the automobile involved in the collision. The court went on to
hold that the evidence of intoxication was admissible on the issue of the
cause of the collision. Actually, plaintiff was relying on a constitutional
right to keep this evidence out of the case and the question of the probative
force of such evidence was not in question.
XII. ExTiNsic oR PARoL EVIDENCE
Wolf v. Miravalle-6 is authority for the proposition that where an un-
certainty in the description of land conveyed does not appear upon the
face of the deed but evidence discloses that the description applies equally
to two or more parcels, a latent ambiguity is said to exist and extrinsic
or parol evidence is admissible to show which tract or parcel of land was
intended. Before parol evidence has sufficient probative force to be admissi-
ble, inquiry must be made to determine if a latent ambiguity exists. Once
the ambiguity is shown, parol evidence becomes of sufficient probative
value to clarify the ambiguity.
Another example of parol evidence having sufficient probative value
to be admissible is found in Smitt v. Tracy.3 7 Here the court held that evi-
dence of oral agreements and conversations prior to the execution of a
written contract for the purchase of real estate was properly admitted
where a purchaser had counterclaimed for the vendors' fraud in inducing
the purchase. The court said that the plaintiff appeared to recognize the
exception to the parol evidence rule in situations involving fraud but
that plaintiff contended the parol evidence should not be admitted until
a showing of fraud had been made. The court said that it is almost always
necessary to admit parol evidence in order to prove the fraud and there-
36. 372 S.W.2d 28 (Mo. 1963).
37. 372 S.W.2d 925 (Mo. 1963).
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fore the necessity of showing fraud before the parol evidence would become
admissible would for all practical purposes destroy the exception to the
parol evidence rule which exists when fraud is alleged. Therefore, contrary
to the Wolf case,38 where a latent ambiguity existed, and a showing of the
ambiguity was necessary before parol evidence was admissible, no showing
of fraud was necessary in the principal case before parol evidence was ad-
missible on that issue. In applying the holding of the Wolf case and the
holding of the Smith case, it appears that the rule that parol evidence can-
not be admitted to vary the terms of a written contract is premised on the
theory that such evidence normally would have little or no probative force
and therefore should not be admitted as other methods of proof could be
used in most cases. But, in the case of fraud where the fraud can seldom be
proven except by the use of parol evidence, the parol evidence has sufficient
probative force that it should at least be considered by the jury.
In Price v. Ridler0 the plaintiff, purchaser, brought an action for
specific performance of a contract for the sale of real estate. Defendant at-
tempted to admit evidence that plaintiff was advised during negotiations
for the sale that the sale would not be carried out if defendant could
secure a better price for the property before the end of the year. This
evidence was objected to and the court sustained this objection for the rea-
son that it was inadmissible under the parol evidence rule. In this case de-
fendant had contended that the contract between plaintiff and defendant
was oppressive, unfavorable, unequitable, an unreasonable and unconscion-
able bargain, one sided, biting, over reaching; that it worked an unrea-
sonable and disproportionate hardship upon defendant and placed him at
the mercy of plaintiff. This case can be distinguished from the Smith,
case 4 since in this case there was no pleading of fraud by the defendant.
Therefore, there would be no reason to admit parol evidence and it would
not be of sufficient probative force since the unfavorable or unconscionable
bargain could be shown by other evidence such as the unreasonableness of
the contract on its face.
XIII. CONCLUSION
In determining the admissibility of evidence, the test of probative
force is the magic touchstone which dispels confusion, resolves conflicts,
and causes doubt to disappear. It is a reliable guide through the morass
38. Wolf v. Miravalle, supra note 36.
39. 373 S.W.2d 59 (Mo. 1963).
40. Smith v. Tracy, supra note 37.
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created by formalized historical rules. The probative force test is basic.
It is nothing new.
It is referred to by every major author in the field of evidence.
More often than not, it is assumed to be so basic that it requires no
extensive discussion. Instead, he who seeks a fundamental knowledge of
what constitutes admissible evidence is plunged into hearsay, admissions
or declarations against interest, business records and other exceptions to
the hearsay rule, judicial notice, relevancy, conditional relevancy, irrele-
vancy, and similar technical rules, the discussion of which fills volumes.
The fundamental tenet of what evidence is all about is smothered. The
foliage on the branches hides the tree.
Should certain evidence be excluded as irrelevant or admitted as
relevant? Should it be excluded as hearsay or admitted under one of
the myriad exceptions to the hearsay rule? Apply the test. If it tends
to prove or disprove an issue necessary to a decision of the case before
the court, it is relevant. If it has sufficient probative force to logically
tend to prove or disprove that issue, it is admissible and there will be
an applicable exception to the hearsay rule, or it was not hearsay in
the first place.
Unfortunately, the formalized rules of evidence cannot yet be discarded
or ignored. While the admission or exclusion of evidence has been and
still is based on the probative force test, the stated reasons for admissions
and exclusions have been and still are assigned the old formalized historical
name tags. The practicing lawyer must know them and know them well.
He must be able to recite and apply them instantly, if not automatically.
In recent decisions, usually a formalized historical rule of evidence is
given by the supreme court as the reason for its decision. Yet, the court
is clearly cognizant of and following the probative force test. This test
not only resolves any apparent conflict in the recent decisions, it also
allows a reasonably certain prediction of what the court will do on
evidentiary matters in the future.
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